The Role of Decision Making in the Pre-Crisis Period of India
(15 March, 1959 - 7 September, 1962)
More than thirty years have passed since the dramatic cling of arm in the remote
Himalayan region of the Sino-Indian border. This Time gap seems to be appropriate for a
correct reexamination of the conflict. The account of India's attempt to find balance
with China, ever since the Kongska Pass incident in 1959 until the attack of 1962, is not
merely a fact sheet that we can brows and toss and toss away. In stead we have to link
each idea to the event and causes that might have played a role in the conflict.
Ever since 1959 the border problem between Asia's biggest two nation-states has been
picking up speed at a threatening speed. The year 1962 was the unfortunate year for India
which knocked out any possibility of understanding between China and India. Of course,
such an act of terror could have not started without some kind of the reason, whatever it
may be. The chronological order of pre-crisis decisions taken India's authorities are of
great importance.
The role of the decision-makers before the time of the armed conflict had a big
significance for India's position on political and economic matters in the continent of
Asia. A major figure in India's decision making was Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of the
Congress Party, head of the Planning Commission and chief spokesman of the government in
Parliament. These titles not only made him an important nationalistic figure but also
Gandhi's appointed heir and a "major architect of India's political institutions"
(Brecher, 1959). Krishna Menon, "the controversial defense minister consulted in almost
every issue" along with Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant was also a figure of great importance
(Langyel, 1962). This importance was mainly derived from the fact that both shared the
same overall world view of Nehru. However, in order to understand the cruicial importance
of decision-makers, we shall looked seperately at each of India's top men.
Menon was highly important and useful to Nehru in the essence that the latter helped
Nehru convey his thought and policies to the outside world in a forceful and organized
manner (Brecher, 1959). But as Rajani Palme Dutt said in his book "The problem of India,"
foreign policy was exercised "more behind the scenes than in meetings of the committee."
Both Menon and Nehru acted to the desire of Nehru. It was often when the Foreign
secretary would take to Pant drafts of diplomatic correspondence and get the reaction
which was usually at Nehru's request (Hoffmann,1990).
Foreign policy makers Nehru, Menon and Pant shared a common world view which clearly
showed their psychological predisposition, drawn from the sources of their personality,
idiosyncrasy, ideology, tradition, culture and history. As we shall see further down, in
the mainstream of common ideas and beliefs, they indeed had some differences. But all
these men used the "attitudinal prism" (Hoffmann, 1990), the lens through which they
filtered and structured the information thus perceiving the world. One set of Indian
beliefs referred to the role India should play world. This role was supposed to reflect
the fact that India was a considerably new nation-state.
India also had to preserve her independence of action. It didn't simply fight for
independence simply to become a camp follower of any of the Cold War Power blocs. The
restrictions and limitations that such a position imply would be against India's national
interest. And it was exactly this nonalignment policy of Nehru between the two sides of
the Cold War which was the projection of Indian nationalism into world affairs (Maxwell,
1970). Nehru also expressed the idea that India was an Asian power that should not be
overlooked at. He demonstrated that "in regard to any major problem of a country or a
group of countries of Asia, India has to be considered" (Gopal, 1980).
During the 1950's and 1960's Nehru and his advisors realized that India was playing a
far more than neutral role in the Cold War politics. She was a very important player on
the world stage, where questions of war and peace were decided. He recognized that in s
bipolar world, in which relations between the superpowers were based mainly on
"balance-of-power calculations" (Hoffmann, 1990), a nuclear holocaust, for example, had
become highly likely. He sought that India should stay out of the superpowers' way in the
nuclear arms race and at the same time work to the reduction of superpower confrontation
by "fostering communication, engaging in constructive diplomacy and public judging each
action of the United States and the former Soviet Union on its merits" (Brecher, 1959).
Nehru strongly believed that this trend will only act to the good of India, for it was
"economic development that was the countries primary goal" (Hoffmann, 1990). So the act
of nonalignment was an act of peace and not hostility. A nonalignment trend will also
allow India to receive development aid from "as many countries as could be persuaded to
contribute" (Hoffmann, 1990), whatever their Cold War leanings. India's prime minister
was well aware that at the present state the country could not spent considerable amount
of resources for a large defense establishment. An India aligned with no Cold War Power
bloc would help avoid alienating nations like former Soviet Union and China, which were
of great importance to India's security. Nehru himself realized that a hostile frontier
with China, for example, would mean an expenditure of all Indian resources just to defend
it (Gopal, 1980).
Another standard belief that Nehru and the rest of his associates developed in India's
foreign policy affairs was the so called image making (Hoffmann, 1990). Nehru developed
the complex "images" of nations, governments, international trends and situations. Of
course, as later will be shown, they were subject to change, but not that easily. So in
the way of image making, Nehru had made it a fundamental view of Indian foreign policy
to treat former Soviet Union and China as separate powers, passing two different sets of
problems. So, right now, there was no reason for him not to forge the friendliest
possible relationship with former Soviet Union.
The image that Nehru set for the United States was one of more persistent work. The
anti-communism phobia that was shaking the United States at the time, made it very hard
for Indian authority to set its right relations with the U.S. But still, according to
Nehru, relations could be kept constructive and could be improved once the U.S. overcame
their suspicion of nonalignment. Another reason for the obstruction of Indo-American
relations was the U.S. policy toward arming Pakistan military, thereby threatening India
military.
As the result of this momentous post independence decision of India's authority, once
again primarily Nehru and Krishna Menon, the country had accepted membership in the
remains of the British Empire - the Commonwealth (Hoffmann, 1990). This important tie
assured India, that despite of nonalignment it would never be completely isolated. It
would be granted communication with the West and other Third World countries, members
once again in the Commonwealth, and as a result Indian diplomatic influence would be
enhanced. It was both the importance of a continued British supply of military equipment
and the possibility of trade and economic assistance that made this membership so
valuable.
China, however, was the biggest element of concern. Nehru never had the element of
doubt that China's position in the communist world will constitute a problem to India
(Gopal, 1980). His largeness of mind led him to the hope that the tradition of nearly two
thousand years of peace could continue in an era of Indian and Chinese national
reassertion. He was determined to prevent the former Soviet Union and China from
combining powers against India. But he also knew that the Chinese as well as the Russians
were acting on the strength of their own national foreign policy interests and
imperatives.
In the 1950's Nehru realized, as he carried out in a letter to a member of the Chinese
authority, that India very well understood the problems China was facing after the
prolong suffer and struggle against Japan. He also understood that the successful
communist revolution in China added new feeling to the political palette of China. Thus
he perceived it as a "mixture of bitterness, elation and vaunting confidence to which
the traditional xenophobia and present day isolation from outside contacts have added
suspicion of the motives of other powers" (Brecher, 1959). For two years he elaborated on
these points, when describing China as on object of study by India's Intelligence Bureau.
In a briefing he told IB officers that during centuries Indian and Chinese cultures had
contested for supremacy in Central Asia and Tibet, as well as in Burma and other places
in Southeast Asia. Thus, conflict between India and China had never been direct, but
there had been intense indirect competition, which was continuing (Hoffmann, 1990).
Furthermore, China had shown the tendency to be "aggressive" (Maxwell, 1970).
On the coarse of logic, it was expected that once China had achieved a certain political
and economic stability, it would seek some form of supremacy, and influence or even
supremacy in Asia. And what lay in the path of the realization of this idea was India.
Nehru was afraid that to achieve their ends, the Chinese might attempt to prove their
superiority over India in the sphere of political and economic might or even occupy some
Southeast Asian countries. A tool that the Chinese might have used, according to Nehru,
was the strong lobby of the Communist party which could stand up and support the Chinese
cause in any dispute with India's government (Maxwell, 1970).
From Nehru's standpoint, China's emergence from the bonds of Western imperialism could
release negative political and character traits. India would have to be alert, especially
on the northern frontier. In 1952 China had no immediate intention to recognize the
India-Tibet border formally. He expected China to extend its influence over frontier
territory once the Chinese position in Tibet had been consolidated. And as a contra
action of that he developed India's frontier administration (Maxwell, 1970).
Throughout most of the 1950's, however, other beliefs received more emphasis both ion
the public and the private spheres. Nehru along with Menon and other high officials that
a friendly relationship between China and India could be established, if Tibet was
removed as an irritant and China was brought out of isolation into a world of emerging or
reemerging nation (Hoffmann, 1990). Nehru knew that the outcome of such a relationship
will bring much to do peace in Asia and that is the reason he considered it to outweigh
his concerns about Tibet. The founding belief of Nehru was that Tibet was a part of
China, "although it should be allowed as much autonomy as possible" (Hoffmann, 1990).
India had formally recognized China's right on Tibet and after 1954 was bound to do so
with a the Sino-Indian trade agreement.
After Nehru returned from a visit to China in 1954 he spoke of the great Chinese
achievements in both the economic and social spheres. But even before that trip Nehru has
sought to follow the Chinese steps of progress; that is, "India should regard China as a
standard of comparison not as open rival" (Hoffmann, 1990). India would follow its own
unique strategy of economic development. That particular strategy called for
"government-directed economic planning, a government-controlled public sector of
utilities and industries, and a cooperative but independent private sector" (Hoffmann,
1990).
The climax of the conflict, as to Nehru, came in the fall of 1959 when China's behavior
which through his "attitudinal prism" led him to alter the previous image of China. The
final and most serious border problem completed a intensifying process where Nehru
adopted a new set of beliefs concerning the Chinese beliefs concerning Chinese motives
for starting the border conflict. Those beliefs were firstly that China was definitely
acting "arrogant" and imbued with feelings of superiority. The second belief was that
China was a revolutionary and unsatisfied power which at the time was in aggressive mood.
Third belief was that China was an expansionist country, which meanwhile was strong
internally. Fourth came the belief that Chinas attempt to influence and pressure India
was due to Communist ideology. The fifth believe was that all these previously mentioned
traits have been strengthened by the recent isolation imposed on China by the West.
Paranoidity and one-track mind was the sixth believe. And following from the latter
believe came idea that China would, therefore, not be interested in the kind of border
settlement that India could accept (Hoffmann, 1990). Thus Prime Minister Nehru pictured
China as a hostile country predisposed to harm India and the strength of deep-seated
emotions.
The Sino-Indian border problem seen through the "attitudinal prism" of Defense Minister
Krishna Menon was different from Nehru's view. Even though Menon and Nehru were on the
same side of the battle, they indeed shared some differences. While Nehru was following
the concepts of Marxism and Leninism, Menon pursued "Laski's neo-Marxism" of the 1930's
(Langyel, 1962). In that way he retained a basic acceptance of the Leninist theory of
imperialism which according to Menon outgrew capitalism. The Defense Minister's images of
India's neighbors were also strongly influenced by his distrust of imperialism and
capitalism. The "central place of Menon's assault of Imperialism in the 1950's and
1960's was prescribed to the United States, which in the eyes of Menon was the major
Western power which was inclined to intervene in the affairs of the non-Western world"
(Langyel, 1962). Due to that he considered not China, but Pakistan to be the main threat
to India's security. For Pakistan, after independence, had become tied up to the new
American imperialist system through a treaty and the acceptance of military aid. As an
American client Pakistan weakened the area of peace and served the instrument with which
imperialism could threat India's security.
In contrast to Nehru's vision of China, Krishna Menon had a very positive image it.
Although he rejected totalitarian methods anywhere he viewed China as a progressive,
modern and socialist state. The Defense Minister also felt a kind of "spiritual kinship"
with China (Langyel, 1962). And even when the India-China relations edged in 1959 Menon
still regarded China as all but an enemy. In stead he argued that the boarder incidents
rose from the fact that China considered that the Tibetan refugees in India might return
to Tibet and start a rebellion. Other Chinese motives underlying the border problem,
according to Menon, were firstly that a certain Chinese "despondency" over internal
economic problems existed and secondly the youthful, aggressive passion of the Chinese
revolution (Langyel, 1962). All through the pre-crisis period Krishna Menon believed that
frustration caused by the international isolation imposed on communist China was the
factor which aided and guided the formation of the Japanese attitudes.
Throughout the whole conflict he remained certain that China had taken India mistakenly
as representing threat from the imperialist West.
On the question how to deal with the Sino-Indian conflict, Menon became the leading
defender of a new school of thought. To that school the territorial disagreement between
China and India was genuine, and not a reflection of deeper Chinese hostility.
According to the school a political settlement with the Chinese could be reached and
might also include territorial compromise (Langyel, 1962).
In the political battle between India and China a lot of hard decisions had to be made.
The authority of decision-making, as we saw, laid mainly in the hands of a few people in
the high levels of the Indian authority building. Their appropriate actions in the
Sino-Chinese border problem were of crucial importance. Some of them were hard to be
taken, others were voted secretly and even some decisions were left undecided. India's
correct evaluation of its conflict with China enabled her to act accordingly and carry
out its plans in such a chronological order that would be best for its national security.
The importance of correct decision-making and the ability to choose right from wrong is
the single most important feature each political leader should try to control to the rate
of perfection.
Sources of Information:
Brecher, Michael. (1959). Nehru: A Political Bibliography. Oxford University Press:
London.
Dutt, Rajani Palme. (1943). The Problem of India. International Publishers: New York
Gopal, Sarvepolli. (1980). Jawaharlal Nehru. Oxford University Press: Delhi.
Hoffmann, Steven. (1990). India & China in Crisis. University of California Press:
London.
Langyel, Emil. (1962). Krishna Menon. Walker & Company: New York
Maxwell, Neville. (1970). India's China War. Pantheon Books: New York.
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