This reading was based on the controversy over the
threat that nuclear smuggling poses. It begins by going
over the view of each side in a brief manner. It states
that some analysts dismiss it as a minor nuisance while
others find the danger to be very real and probable.
This reading stands mainly for the belief that nuclear
smuggling is a real danger. The analysts that find this
issue to be a problem say that nuclear smuggling presents
grave and serious because even though the percent of
these type of smuggling is less than that of drugs for
example, the law-enforcement type officials are also less
experienced at stopping shipments of an item such as
uranium than they are in seizing marijuana or hashish.
These same analysts have also found that even a small
leakage rate of any type of nuclear material can have
extremely vast consequences and dangers. They say that
although secrecy rules make precise numbers impossible to
get, Thomas B. Cochran of the Natural Resources Defense
Council in Washington, D.C., estimates that a bomb
requires between three and 25 kilograms of enriched
uranium or between one and eight kilograms of plutonium.
A Kilogram of plutonium occupies about 50.4 cubic
centimeters, or one seventh the volume of a standard
aluminum soft-drink can.
In addition to this, analysts have found that
security is much to lax in even the supposedly "most
protected locations". For example, the Russian stores in
particular suffer from sloppy security, poor inventory
management and inadequate measurements. Then there is the
virtually nonexistent security at nuclear installations
that compounds the problem. The main reason for this
lack of security is that pay and conditions have worsened
and disaffection has become widespread. So with an
alienated workforce suffering from low and often late
wages, the incentives for nuclear theft have become far
greater at the very time that restrictions and controls
have deteriorated.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising
that the number of nuclear-smuggling incidents-both real
and fake-has increased during the few years. German
authorities for example, reported 41 in 1991, 158 in
1992,241 in 1993 and 267 in 1994. Although most of these
cases did involve material suitable for bombs, as the
number of incidents increases so does the likelihood that
at least a few will include weapons-grade alloys.
In March 1993, according to a report from Istanbul,
six kilograms of enriched uranium entered Turkey through
the Aralik border gate in Kars Province. Although
confirmation of neither the incident nor the degree of
the uranium's enrichment was forthcoming, It raised fears
that Chechen "Mafia" groups had obtained access to
enriched uranium in Kazakhastan.
So what should we do about this? Some suggest that
systematic multinational measures be taken as soon as
possible to inhibit theft at the source, to disrupt
trafficking, and to deter buyers. The U.S., Germany,
Russia and other nations with an interest in the nuclear
problem should set up a "flying squad" with an
investigative arm, facilities for counterterrorist and
counterextortion actions and a disaster management team.
Even though such an idea may seem extremely far-fetched
at the moment because of a continuing reluctance to
recognize the severity of the there, it is minutely the
consensus that it would be a horrible tragedy if
governments were to accept the need for a more
substantive program only after a nuclear catastrophe.
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