The Bush Administration's Relation With Iraq
Prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait:
Credibility and Misperception
Prior to the August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait on the part of Iraq, the United States
had questionable relations with Iraq dictator, Saddam Hussein, to say the least. In
retrospect, which is inherently advantageous as a 20/20 perspective, questions remain
unanswered as to whether or not the United States was too appeasing to Saddam Hussein in
the years, months, and days leading up to that early August morning. There remains to
this day lingering questions as to the role that the US Ambassador to Iraq, April
Glaspie, played in conveying the Administration's message to the Iraqi leader. In
addition, questions surrounding the Administrators official policy, the calculations (or
miscalculations) on the part of the State Department and other agencies within the US
government, the Administrations covert plan to aid an Italian bank in illegal loans to
benefit Saddam's military and the advice that the US received from other Arab nations
with respect to what US relations should be with Iraq in terms of any impending border
dispute, constitute a limited context of the issues that faced the Administration as it
tried to deal with the leader of the largest economy of the Persian Gulf region.
The Bush Administration's relations with Iraq prior to its invasion of Kuwait were
clouded in a context of misperception by both states and further complicated by a lack of
credibility on the part of key actors of both sides as well. This tragic sequence of
events that led to the invasion of Kuwait cannot solely be attributed to personality
traits or even actions by key individuals within the Administration. In retrospect, it
is much more complex than that. However, the actions and public and private statements
on the part of key personnel on both sides most likely contributed to the eventual
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.
Since, a brief, yet modest account of the history of the events leading up to the
invasion and the invasion in itself along with the regional and global actors has been
offered in section A, section B will be an analysis of the role of misperception and
questions of credibility with respect to key actors on both sides of the issue, from
State Department officials to Saddam Hussein himself. While touching on the importance
and significance of other aspects of the sequence of events already mentioned, specific
focus will be given to the actions of the US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, as she
personally delivered the diplomatic message that the Bush Administration wanted to send
to the Iraqi leader at the time we knew of the accumulation of close to 100,000 Iraqi
troops onto Iraq's southern border with Kuwait.
Summoned before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to clarify her role in the
Administration's relations with Iraq prior to August 2, 1990, Ambassador Glaspie offered
her version of the events that led to the invasion. She recalled that Iraq had first and
foremost just finished a long, drawn out war with its neighbor and nemesis, Iran.
Hussein, she recalled, had made repeated threats against the state of Israel in the first
half of 1990, but abruptly switched his focus from Israel to that of Kuwait and another
neighbor to the south, the United Arab Emirates. ?He announced in that speech, in the
crudest and most unmistakable way, that if Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates did not
revise their oil policy and produce according to their OPEC quotas, Iraq would take upon
itself effective measures to make sure they did.?1 Later, under examination by members
of the Senate Committee, Glaspie further detailed Iraq's basic conflict with Kuwait and
the UAE as ?...it was Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates whom he [Saddam] accused of
overproducing their OPEC quotas which of course put prices down and he needed the prices
up because he was deeply in debt.?2 That debt, of course, had been incurred by Hussein
in the drawn out conflict with Iran only years earlier.
SETTING THE AMERICAN TRAP FOR HUSSEIN
"The Americans were determined to go to war from the start," and Saddam Hussein "walked
into a trap" according to the former French foreign minister Claude Cheysson (IHT March
11). "State Department officials...led Saddam Hussein to think he could get away with
grabbing Kuwait....Bush and Co. gave him no reason to think otherwise" (New York Daily
News Sept. 29).
The Former White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger has written at length about how
this trap was set. Bits and pieces of the jigsaw puzzle trap are also emerging elsewhere,
however; and some may be summarily put together here. The belatedly publicized July 25
interview between President Hussain and American Ambassador April Glaspie is literally
only the tip of the largely submerged iceberg of this trap setting story.
Evidence has emerging to suggest that the Persian Gulf war is the result of a long
process of preparation, much more so than the Tonkin Gulf one in Vietnam. For a decade
during the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein's Iraq had enjoyed US and Western military,
political and economic support, including $ 1.5 billion of sales approved by the U.S.
government. George Bush had been a key figure in the Reagan Administration's support for
Iraq. After the conclusion of Iraq's war with Iran and the accession of George Bush to
the American presidency, US policy towards Iraq became increasingly confusing at best
and/or the product of a downright Machiavellian strategy to deceive Iraq and set a trap
for Hussein.
In March 1990, the "U.S. Bungled Chance to Oust Hussein, Report Says" (IHT May
4-5,l991). According to a belated U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report,
rebellious Iraqi military officers had sent out feelers asking Washington for support for
a coup against Saddam Hussein. However, the Bush adminstration rebuffed them, and they
desisted.
The [forced?] resignation and the testimony to Congress of former Undersecretary of
Commerce for Export Administration Dennis Kloske revealed that in April 1990 he
recommended "at the highest levels" the reduction of high tech sales to Iraq. He himself
sought to delay these exports by tying them up in red tape to compensate for the lack of
such action by the Bush administration. Still during the last week of July, the Bush
administration approved the sale of 3.4 million in computers to Iraq. The day before the
invasion of Kuwait on August 1, the US approved the sale of $ 695,000 of advanced data
transmission devices (IHT March 12). As Kloske later testified, "The State Department
adamantly opposed my position, choosing instead to advocate the maintenance of diplomatic
relations with Iraq" (IHT, April 11).
Later in May l990, the National Security Council [NSC] submitted a white paper to
President Bush "in which Iraq and Saddam Hussein are described as 'the optimum contenders
to replace the Warsaw Pact' as the rationale for continuing cold war ilitary spending and
for putting an end to the 'peace dividend'." Yet the same NSC toned down an April 30
speech by Vice President Dan Quayle adding "emphasis on Iraq misplaced given U.S. policy,
other issues" [John Pilger, The New Statesman Feb. 8].
At the State Department, Secretary James Baker had promoted John Kelly to Assistant
Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs. Kelly visited Baghdad in February, "the
records of which he is desperately trying to deep-six [bury]" (William Safire, IHT March
26,1191]. However, it has been revealed that Kelly told President Hussein that "President
Bush wants good relations with Iraq, relations built on confidence and trust." Moreover,
Kelly then rebuked the Voice of America and countermanded the Defense
Department on statements, which he considered too unfriendly to Iraq. On April 26, Kelly
testified to Congress that Bush administration policy towards Iraq remained the same and
praised Saddam Hussein for "talking about a new constitution and an expansion of
participatory democracy." Still on July 31, two days before the August 2 invasion of
Kuwait, Kelly again testified to a Congressional sub-committee "we have no defense
treaty
with any Gulf country."
Kelly had sent the same message to President Hussein through the U.S. American
Ambassador April Glaspie. In the July 25 interview with President Saddam Hussein, she
told him that "we have no opinion on ...conflicts like your border dispute with
Kuwait...I have direct instruction from the President... Secretary of State James Baker
has directed our official spokesman to emphasize this instruction." "Mr. President
[Hussein], not only do I want to tell you that President Bush wants better and closer
relations with Iraq, but also that he wants Iraq to contribute to peace and prosperity in
the Near East. President Bush is an intelligent man. He is not going to declare economic
war against Iraq." In her testimony to Congress, which the State Department deliberately
delayed until after the
end of the war, Ambassador Glaspie was asked "did you ever tell Saddam Hussein...if you
go across that line into Kuwait, we're going to fight?" Ambassador Glaspie replied "No, I
did not."
According to Glaspie's testimony before the Senate committee, the United States
responded almost immediately to the blatant threat that Hussein had imposed on Kuwait.
Glaspie recalled the public statement that the State Department spokeswoman Margaret
Tutwiler made on behalf of the US government. ?She said we were strongly committed to
the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the gulf. That's a pretty
clear statement, I think.?3 Tutwiler had declared that the US would defend its vital
interests in the gulf region.
Glaspie also stated that the senior Iraqi official in the US was told at the State
Department that the US would continue to defend its vital interests in the gulf, and
would continue to support the sovereign rights of each individual nation in the region.
?He was reminded that while we would not take positions on the equities of bilateral
Iraqi-Kuwaiti disputes, we would insist--I repeat insist--that disputes be settled
peacefully and not by threat or intimidation.?4 While first clearly portraying a
message to Hussein that the United States would indeed defend it ?vital interests,? the
message suddenly became at the very least a little muffled and foggy as US officials
also claimed that no sides would be taken on the part of the US in any bilateral dispute
among neighbors in the Arab world. This seems to be the first incident of possible
confusion and miscalculation caused by the official US policy towards Iraq at the time.
Which policy was Hussein to believe, one of clear confrontation or one of independent
observer? At the very least, the combination of the above statements gave Hussein mixed
signals on the Administration's response to his threats.
It was on July 20 that the US government first picked up intelligence information that
indicated the amassing of Iraqi troops along the border with Kuwait, according to
Glaspie's testimony. Recalling her frequent diplomatic efforts to meet with Iraqi
officials, Glaspie recounted how the US went against the popular opinion within the Arab
world to not provoke Hussein into further conflict. It was advised to the US on part of
other Arab nations that any US response (e.g. a show of force) would result in sure
military conflict with the Iraqis. The US chose not to take such advice, rather engaging
in a joint military exercise with the United Arab Emirates on July 24. Following this
exercise, Glaspie recalled how she was summoned to meet with Hussein himself on July 25.
HE SAID, SHE SAID
The meeting between Hussein and Glaspie on July 25 served as a pivotal moment in time in
the overall situation. It is this meeting that remains controversial in the United
States to this very day for a variety of reasons. It was the first personal contact that
any US official had had with Hussein after he had ordered his troops to descend upon the
Kuwaiti border. This was a opportune time to convey to Hussein exactly what the
consequences would be, what clear and decisive action the United States would take,
should Iraq invade Kuwait or any other country in the region. Glaspie recalls that
Hussein ?spoke on the telephone with President Mubarak and he wanted to inform President
Bush that he would not solve his problems with Kuwait by violence, period. He would not
do it. He would take advantage of the Arab diplomatic framework which President Mubarak
and King Fahd had set up. That's what he would do.?5
Although Hussein had claimed he would not use brute force to resolve Iraq's conflict
with Kuwait, he obviously lied about his intentions. But the Iraqi press, which Hussein
no doubt controls, continued to keep the entire world fooled about Hussein's intentions
for the few days between July 25 and august 2, 1990. Testifying about the Iraqi press'
previous slander of Kuwait, Glaspie said, ?Every day for the past 10 days the front pages
had been crowded with insults toward Kuwait and its rulers. Every word of that was
dropped, and, I might add, the Arab ambassadors, many of then dropped by and
congratulated our tactics. They believed he meant what he said.?6
Again, what Hussein had succeeded in doing was fooling the entire world into believing
that he would not use force to solve Iraq's conflict with Kuwait. No one in the US
government anticipated that he would use force at that moment, although he continued to
amass troops along the Kuwaiti border. Hussein was taken for his word. It turned out,
however, that Hussein's credibility was nill and the US made a blatant miscalculation in
its policy toward Iraq. Coming off years of supporting Iraq in its war with Iran, the
Bush administration could not find a way to unequivocally portray upon Hussein that if he
were to use force against Kuwait and invade and occupy Kuwait, the United States would
respond with a force of unacceptable levels to the dictator and expel him from Kuwait.
There is a certain level of speculation in hindsight surrounding this very complex issue.
Questions remain regarding whether or not Hussein had already made up his mind whether
or not to invade Kuwait prior to the July 25 meeting with Glaspie, whether or not his
mind could have been changed with adequate persuasion, whether or not Hussein's choice to
proceed could have been altered by tough, clear and precise diplomatic relations between
Glaspie or other US official and the dictator. All of these questions remain unanswered,
although a more complete analysis of the misperceptions, miscalculations, and credibility
issues, especially with respect to the role that Ambassador Glaspie played on July 25,
surely raises more questions than answers. At the very least, it is safe to say that
while the Bush Administration's relations with Iraq prior to August 2 were clouded in
misperception, unclear communication, and questions regarding credibility, the actions
that were taken in the days prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait certainly did not have
a clear effect of halting the use of military force. If anything, stances taken on the
part of the Administration most likely contributed to the implicit assumption on the part
of Saddam Hussein that Kuwait was his for the taking, and he would not face a significant
opposition on the part of the United States or any other country.
WAS GLASPIE CLEAR ?
Turning now to an analysis of the July 25 meeting between US Ambassador to Iraq April
Glaspie and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, it is apparent when looking at the public record
of Glaspie's statements in chronological order that there was some level of secrecy
regarding the meeting at the very least.
Glaspie's account of the meeting differed greatly from a transcript published by the
Iraqi government that was provided to ABC News. That transcript, written in Arabic and
translated into English, showed Glaspie as being nothing less than appeasing to the Iraqi
director. Responding to Hussein's criticism of the American news media, Glaspie stated,
according to the Iraqi version of the transcript of the meeting, "Mr. President, not only
do I want to say that President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he
also wants an Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity to the Middle East. President
Bush is an intelligent man. He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.?7
While causation must be applied immediately when taking into account the source of this
transcript, revelations that Congressional committees made later on in the chronology of
events will prove the prudent analyst to think twice about statements contained in the
Iraqi version of the transcript. Clearly, if Glaspie were to have said this to Hussein,
and take likelihood of this statement being made is closer to probable than fictitious,
it is not a strong statement on the part of the US that should Hussein use force, he
would be met with an overwhelming and unacceptable military force that will expel him
from Iraq and destroy much of what his country has for its infrastructure. On the
contrary, such a statement sends a clearer signal that the US will not even adopt the
option of trade sanctions.
According to a New York Times article published on September 23, 1990, the
Administration's message to Iraq, personally delivered by Glaspie to Hussein, was that
"the United States was concerned about Iraq's military buildup on its border with Kuwait,
but did not intend to take sides in what it perceived as a no-win border dispute between
Arab neighbors."8 The article continued by referring to the same Iraqi transcript of the
session between Glaspie and Hussein by stating that Glaspie had said to Hussein, ?We have
no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.?9
All the while, the US Administration was operated on the false assumption that Iraq
would not invade Kuwait, that Hussein would keep his word. This misperception caused the
US government to fall into a situation where officials felt that, after consulting with
other Arab nations, the US should avoid further escalating the situation by refraining
from using inflammatory rhetoric or threats of force. Some administration officials
conceded that the US would be willing to live with a limited invasion of Kuwait. ?The
crucial factor in determining the American response was not the reality but the extent of
the invasion.?10
The policy of appeasement of Iraq, which President Bush eventually admitted to being
flawed, was based on the assumption, along other things, that both Iran and Iraq would
focus on internal reconstruction following their prolonged war, not international
takeovers of other countries. Prior to the July 25 meeting, Administration officials
sent mixed signals to Iraq with regard to US policy. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney on
July 19 said that ?the American commitment made during the Iran-Iraq War to come to
Kuwait's defense if it were attacked, was still valid.?11
Five days later, on July 24, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler said ?We do
not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security
commitments to Kuwait ... We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individuals
and collective self-defense of our friends in the gulf with whom we have a deep and long
standing ties.?12
This combination of mixed signals sourced in two high level American official surely did
nothing to warn Hussein of imminent military response should Kuwait be attacked.
The Administration took a quiet stance with respect to Ambassador Glaspie's performance
in her role following the invasion of Kuwait. She was ordered back to Washington were
she was immediately assigned to the Iraq desk in the State Department. The Department
of Stake took a hands off approach in trying to explain Glaspie's actions at the
beginning, and waited seven months before publicly stating a response to the Iraqi
transcript of the session between Glaspie and President Hussein. ? The public
explanation given by the State Department today was that it had known for seven months
that an Iraqi transcript of a meeting between Ambassador Glaspie and President Hussein
was inaccurate in parts, but did not correct the record because officials did not want to
divert attention from organizing the anti-Iraqi coalition.?13
The article continues by stating that the Administration seemed to want to have it both
ways, ?Publicly, they want to appear to be supporting Ms. Glaspie fully so that no one
will accuse them of making her into a scapegoat and no one will say that anyone gave
President Hussein a green light. But when challenged on why they have waited so long to
defend her, they leave the impression that they are uncertain about just how tough she
was with the Iraqi leader.?14
Nearly four months later, Congressional leaders had the opportunity to view a key
document which Ambassador Glaspie sent back to the State Department on July 25 following
her meeting with President Hussein. This document, kept secret until July 12, 1990,
showed Glaspie taking a more appeasing stance with Hussein than she had testified to in
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March of 1990. Senator
Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, expressed his deep concern
in a letter to Secretary of State James Baker, III, and ?demanded an explanation of what
he called ?inconsistencies' between Ms. Glaspie's testimony and the cabled summary.?15
The article continued to point out that although Hussein made repeated threats to
Kuwait, Glaspie departed from the meeting convinced that Hussein would not invade Kuwait.
?Contrary to her testimony that Mr. Hussein had told her he would settle his dispute
with Kuwait peacefully, Mr. Hussein made a number of veiled threats during the meeting
that he might have to resort to force. But Ms. Glaspie came away convinced that he did
not intend to invade Kuwait.?16
Secret cables were sent from President Bush to Hussein as well, also taking a
conciliatory stance with the Iraqi leader. Bush's words were similar to those of
Glaspie's, ?We believe that differences are best resolved by peaceful means and not by
threats involving military force or conflict ... My administration continues to desire
better relations with Iraq.?
The result of such mixed accounts of events just prior to August 2, 1990, suggest that
the Administration was covering up something that it viewed as a terrible blunder in
policy.
CONCLUSSION
In conclusion, hindsight cannot proclaim with certainty that a stronger, clearer, policy
toward Iraq would have precluded the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. No one can tell what the
Iraqi dictator would have done had the United States stated clearly and unequivocally
from the outset that it would defend the nation of Kuwait should Iraq invade it. Popular
sentiment among officials and pundits at the time argued against such a strong stance,
saying it would only provoke Hussein.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the US relations with Iraq were clouded in misperception,
and that the credibility of those actors involved was in serious doubt. The United
States sent varying signals to Hussein, sourced in a range from the President to the
Secretaries of State and Defense to the US Ambassador to Iraq.
Those varying expressions of policy had the immediate effect of giving Hussein the
impression and misconception that the United States would do nothing should he proceed
with his plan to take over Kuwait. It had the long term affect of raising credibility
questions of each and every official involved, beginning with the President, and going
all the way down to the Ambassador, for she was only carrying out the Administration's
policy. ?Officials maintain the signal was meant to stop any aggression, but by then
Saddam needed a stick with the heft of a two-by-four: a direct military warning of US
military intervention.?17
As stated before, it is unclear what Saddam would have done had he received a direct
threat of military opposition from the US. Nonetheless, more than any other blunder, the
Bush Administration failed into by falsely believing that Hussein could be appeased into
a better behavior. Intelligence information was disregarded, and policy was based on
false pretense that Hussein was telling the truth in that he would not invade Kuwait.
Hussein proved to be lying through his teeth.
While fault lies with those involved, the overall blame must be placed on George Bush,
as he held the elected office of President of the United States, and his policy was the
one that failed to stop, yet, allowed the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq without a second
thought on the part of Saddam Hussein.
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1 Glaspie, April, Opening Remarks, Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
3/20/91
2 Glaspie, April, Examination by Senator Dodd, Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 3/20/91
3 Glaspie, April, Opening Remarks, Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
3/20/91
4 Glaspie, April, Opening Remarks, Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
3/20/91
5 Glaspie, April, Opening Remarks, Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
3/20/91
6 Glaspie, April, Opening Remarks, Hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
3/20/91
7 Iraqi Government, Excerpts from Iraqi Document on Meeting with US Envoy, ?The New York
Times, 9/23/90, p.19
8 Sciolino, Elaine, ?US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,? The New
York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1
9 Sciolino, Elaine, ?US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,? The New
York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1
10 Sciolino, Elaine, ?US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,? The New
York Times, 9/23/90, p.A1
11 Sciolino, Elaine, ?US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,? The New
York Times, 9/23/90, p.A18
12 Sciolino, Elaine, ?US Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault,? The New
York Times, 9/23/90, p.A18
14 Friedman, Thomas, ?US Explains View of Envoy to Iraq,? The New York Times, 3/22/31,
p.A9, col. 1
15 Sciolino, Elaine, ?Envoy's Testimony on Iraq is Assailed,? The New York Times,
7/13/91, p.A1, col.1
16 Sciolino, Elaine, ?Envoy's Testimony on Iraq is Assailed,? The New York Times,
7/13/91, p.A4, col.1
17 McAllister, J.F.O., ?The Lessons of Iraq,? Time, 11/2/92, pp.57-59
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