1. Define Omnipotence. Does it mean to be able to do anything at all or to simply be the
"most" powerful being.
2. Does Decartes response involving Gods free will to change the laws (that He created)
at least in principle, successfully reply to all questions of Gods Omnipotence? For
example, if He wished to create a square circle could he not suspend the laws of
contradiction to do so? p 413 - foot notes.
3. Aquinas changes his definition of Devine Omnipotence to state that "God can do
whatever is possible."(p 415 par 2) Kenny points out the need for clarification with the
term "possible" citing natural and supernatural possibility. It seems that all
distinctions would be problematic for mono-theism. Consider this; Can God create a child
for Himself to rear who has many God-like powers including rule over humans? If He can
Does this not imply the possibility of poly-theism?
4. Is Mavrodes classification of creating a stone too heavy for an omnipotent being to
lift as a "pseudo-task" with no power at all ,acceptable? ( p 412 par 2)
5. If God created a stone of infinite weight this would satisfy the condition of it's
not being movable. It seems that God has already created beings with the property of
infinity such as the universe and, if you side with Decartes, numbers. Gods inability to
find the last number is in no way detrimental to his omnipotence because of its property
of infinity. Just as Gods infinite power to count can survive the inability to conclude a
last number, so should his infinite power to lift survive the inability to lift an
infinite weight. At best the task of lifting the object becomes the psuedo-task that
Mavrodes was describing. Does this remove the paradox?
6. Would being omniscient and being able to do what you want be a sufficient definition
for omnipotence? If this is acceptable would St. Augustine's contention be sufficient in
that it was intended in relation to God? ( p 415 par 1)
7. ref. Quote p 418 What effect would substituting " what I am thinking of" for "A" have
on Aquanis' contention that the predicate and subject of a term need only agree for it to
be possible?
8. If God were capable of doing self contradictory things, would this not be repugnant
to the notion of an absolute possible, which is subject to the Devine Omnipotence? Is
Frankfurt's contention actually a logical denial of Omnipotence?
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