President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative:
In Relation with the Soviet Union
?For the first time humankind has the power to destroy itself.? 1 The nuclear age has
changed the world, for the good and the bad. Though the bad, is far greater than the
good. We sometimes ponder to our selves, ?what would happen if we were forced in to a
nuclear war ware their are now winners.? The way life would be after such an incident
would change life as we know it drastically. In the event of a nuclear war with the
Soviets we would have lost approximately one hundred and fifty million American lives. 2
The planet would be destroyed to the extent that even thoughts who survived would have no
place to live. No Government, or persons, can win a nuclear war and as long as their are
nuclear missiles of mass destruction there will always be the risk of someone using them.
Once the first missile is unleashed their is no telling were it would stop.
Our dealings with the former Soviet Union was based on the French word, detente, that
the Russians had defined as a freedom to purchase subversion, aggression and expansionism
any were in the world. 3 The soviets have been, up until 1990, the U.S's defacto enemies.
There goal was too destroy democracy and imposing communism. 4 This is way it was though
to be inevitable for a nuclear war with the soviets. ?The dream of a non nuclear world is
a great and notable one, how ever for the foreseeable future it is unattainable in
actuality and unwise in theory.? 5 Because of this harsh the United States is left with a
problem; How can we beet this so called inevitability? The answer is: space based defense
weapons. The program, brought forth by the Reagan administration, was called the
strategic defense Initiative, and some called ?Star Wars.? 6 Reagan's strategic defense
initiative, created in the 80's, was an acceptable for the U.S; it worked to convince the
Soviets not only to reduce there nuclear arsenal but to halt any chance for a nuclear
attack by the Soviets.
? What is the worth of our society as we know it? Right now we hold an entire population
hostage.? 7 Ever since the 1960's our main defense against the soviets has been the MAD
policy, Mutual Assured Destruction. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had
enough nuclear weapons at their disposal so that if one fired at the other the one that
was being fired at would fire it's missiles at the other too. In other words, they would
share the same fate.8
Wherever the President goes he carries a small plastic- coated card, and a military aid
is always present. This aid cares a small bag called ?the football,? it contains
directions for the launching of all our nuclear weapons. The card carried by the
President listed codes confirming that is was indeed him, the choice to launch was
entirely his.9 This should not even be necessary. ?Underneath it all, people don't think
there is any hope to avoid a nuclear war, it has taken away peoples hope.?10 That hope
was restored in 1983 when President Reagan announced his commitment to the American
people to do what ever it took to make the SDI fly. For a lot of Americans his commitment
to this program was an alternative to a nuclear holocaust.11 The SDI is a sidelight
system that was to be put in space with large lazier guns attached to it. These lazier
would intercept and destroy nuclear missiles when they emerged from their silos. Reagan
was willing to share this technology with others willing to reduce their nuclear
arsenals. ?One day a madman could come along and make the missiles and black mail all the
world. but not if we have a defense a against them.? 12 ?We all got together in 1925 and
banned the use of poisons gas. But we all kept our gas masks.? 13 Reagan was
instrumentally right with this statement. The SDI gave the United States an opportunity
to almost force the world to pay close attention. If the entire world had the SDI it
would make nuclear weapons obsolete. So what was once ?unattainable? yesterday might be,
in time to come, very attainable.
The SDI would end The arms race. Gorbachev ?had to know that Americans military
technology was overwhelmingly superior to his.? 14 ?He also had to Know that we'(the U.S)
?could outspend the Soviets on weapons.? 15 In 1983 the U.S spent 34 thousand million on
defense technology alone.16 We spent 24 billion dollars, over a seven year period, on the
SDI.17 We have 165 U.S satellites in orbit right now, each one coasting in excess of one
billion each.18
Our economic system, capitalism, is far more superior to the Soviets system, communism.
The proof is that our system our countries system is going strong, theirs collapsed in
1989 with the fall of communism in eastern Europe. This is also prop that we did out
spend them.
With the deployment of the SDI the Soviets weapons would be no longer a thereat to the
U.S. What leverage they had in the past would die with the SDI. Their only hope to keep
some of the power they had would be to agree to massive arms reduction, on both sides.
Above all it would bring a lasting peace between our two nations.
The Soviets at first thought our research on the SDI was as an offensive, first strike
capability. This was not the case at all. It was a defense weapon only. The SDI was not a
bargaining chip, opposed to popular belief. Reagan wrote in his diary in July of 1985,
?Made a decision we would not trade away our program of research SDI for a promise of
Soviet reduction in nuclear arms.? 19 While the Soviets were ?whining? about the research
we'd done on the SDI, they had been conducting similar research for more than twenty
years.20 Gorbachev was adamant that the U.S must cave in on the SDI. 21 Reagan stated
that ?this will be a case of an irresistible force meeting an immovable object.? 22)
Gorbachev was not willing to agree to any weapons reductions until we renounced ?the
development, Testing and deployment of space-strike weapons,? a reference to SDI.23
Though in late 1988, the U.S and the Soviet Union agreed of a fifty percent reduction in
both their arms, while keeping our research on the SDI.
Before Gorbachev, every Soviet leader had vowed to the pursuit of a Marxist commitment
and world ruled by the communist system; he was the first not to push Soviet
expansionism, the first to agree to destroy nuclear weapons, the first to suggest a free
market and to support open election and freedom of expression. 24
?The two of us were in a unique situation. Here we were, I said, two men who had been
born in obscure rural hamlets in our respective countries, each of us poor and from
humble beginnings. Now we were the leaders of our countries and probably the only two men
in the world who could bring about World War III.
At the same time, I said, we were possibly the only two men who might be able to bring
peace to the world. I said I thought we owed it to the world to use the opportunity that
had been presented us to work at building the kind of human trust and confidence in each
other that could lead to genuine peace. Listening to the translation, Gorbachev seemed to
nod in agreement.?25
Nuclear weapons serve no purpose in tomorrows world. Once nuclear weapons they power.
Today we almost have the technology to destroy them if their was an attempt to use them.
Not only that but the world has come together and reduced their nuclear capability's. We
know that in nuclear war their are no winners just losers. Reagan's Strategic Defense
Initiative, created in the 80's, was an acceptable risk for the U.S; it worked to
convince the Soviets not only to reduce their nuclear arsenal but to halt any chance for
a nuclear attack.
Gorbachev wrote President Reagan in late 1988: ?For the first time in history, nuclear
missiles have been destroyed. Nuclear disarmament is becoming an established and routine
practice.
?In several regions of the world, a process of political settlement of conflicts and
national reconciliation has got under way.
?Our relationship is a dynamic stream, and you and I are working together to widen it. A
stream cannot be slowed down; it can only be blocked or diverted. But that would not be
in our interests. Politics, of course, is the art of the possible. But it is only by
working and maintaining a dynamic dialogue that we will put into effect what we have made
possible, and will make possible tomorrow what is yet impossible today.?26 EndNotes
1.Kazas, Tom, The World Will Never Be the Same (SIRS 1985) G1+
2. Men of the Year, Time- 1983 Highlights (Time : CD-ROM)
3.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
4.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
5.Hodding, Carter, The Reagan Years (New York: George Braziller 1988)
pp.173-174
6.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
7.Kazas, Tom, The World Will Never Be the Same (SIRS 1985) G1+
8.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
9.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
10.Kazas, Tom, The World Will Never Be the Same (SIRS 1985) G1+
11.Kazas, Tom, The World Will Never Be the Same (SIRS 1985) G1+
12.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
13.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
14.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
15.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
16.Scott,William B., Major Cultural Change on Tap in Military Space (CD-
ROM: SIRS 1885)
17.Center for Defense Information, A New Cold War Battleground (CD-ROM: SIRS 1990)
18.Denny, Jeffrey, Star Struck (CD-ROM: SIRS 1991)
19.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
20.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
21.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
22.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
23.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
24.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
25.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
26.Men of the Year, (CD-ROM) Time
Bibliography
?Center for Defense Information.? A New Cold War Battleground: SIRS.
CD-ROM. Jan./Feb. 1990.
?Denny,Jeffrey.? Star Struck: SIRS.
CD-ROM. March/April 1991.
?Kazas,Tom.? The World Will Never Be the Same: SIRS.
CD-ROM. July 7, 1985.
Hodding,Carter. The Reagan Years. New York: George Braziller.
1988
?Defense Budget in 1994.? World Almanac and Book of Facts. 1996 ed.
?Scott,William B.? Major Cultural Change on Tap in Military Space.
CD-ROM. Sep. 18, 1995.
?Men of the Year.? Time- The Weekly Newsmagazine- 1994 Highlights.
CD-ROM. January 2, 1984.
?Men of the Year.? Time- The Weekly Newsmagazine- 1994 Highlights.
CD-ROM. Oct. 1994
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