The history of the Soviet Union is complicated and fascinating. In the course of only
seventy years this country has seen the development of the totally new system of state,
economic growth, the growth of hopes for the "brighter future", and then the s
den and expected by no one collapse of the whole system leading to chaos, wars, and
confusion. One period is especially important in order to realize how did things finally
started to change after the seventy years of blindly pursuing the dream of comm
ism which left the Soviet Union in a very bad economical and moral state, and this period
is called perestroika, Russian for restructuring. The main figure behind this process
which began in 1985 is Mikhail S. Gorbachev who became General Secretary of
e Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee in March 1985. The three books
that concentrate on the "Gorbachev phenomenon" were all unfortunately written before
perestroika was finished, so they do not analyze the consequences that it had fo
the Soviet Union as well as for the whole world . On the other hand, all three of these
books do a good job in explaining the changes that took place in the course of the first
three years after Gorbachev came to power and why were these changes neces
ry.
The first book "Gorbachev" was written by Zhores A. Medvedev in 1986 and hence the author
is concentrating on the first year of the new course in Soviet history. The book itself
basically consists of two parts: the first part where the author describes
he "making of a General Secretary", and the second part entitled "Gorbachev in power"
which describes Gorbachev's first year in the office. The first part of the book gives a
lot of background information which allows the reader to see the stages in de
lopment of the Soviet leader from childhood and youth to second-in-command. One thing I
found to be particularly interesting in Medvedev's description of Gorbachev's youth and
that is the theory that living with a Czech intellectual for five years chan
d the future Soviet leader in such a way that he became more "westernized" which
"indirectly provided the Soviet Union with a new style leader". Medvedev says that
during the time from 1950 to 1955 when young Gorbachev attended the Moscow State Univers
y and had to share the room with a Czech student Zdenek Mlynar he was "profoundly
influenced" by the "culture and attitudes of a traditionally Western nation". This
influence lasted for years and the fact that Gorbachev has become "westernized" in his
pearance, manners, dress and the "image he projects of tolerance and cordial behavior,
all the small signs which mark him as different from the usual Komsomol and Party boss",
is according to Medvedev due to a great extent to the fact that Mlynar was Go
achev's roommate (Medvedev, 1986, p. 43).
Although the first part of the book is certainly interesting and important I would like
to concentrate on the second part of the book since it is directly deals with the subject
that interests me most, that is the years when Gorbachev was in power and t
development of the new course in the Soviet life called perestroika. From just reading
the first paragraph it is obvious that the author approves of the new leader. Medvedev
writes: "For the first time in Soviet history, the leadership succession has
eant more than the arrival of a new leader and the possibility of the implementation of
the new policies. The Gorbachev succession marks the appearance of a new political
generation which differs from the old guard in style, knowledge and historical vi
on....Gorbachev represents a younger post-war political generation, a generation which
started its professional Party or state career during the more liberal Krushchev era" (p.
165). Medvedev quotes some of the very enthusiastic Western newspaper commen
which called Gorbachev a "bright, incisive, brisk-mannered man", with "high
intelligence, considerable organizational abilities, political acumen". According to the
author no previous Soviet leader had received so much immediate publicity and such an
thusiastic welcome from the general public. "Gorbachev's popularity was closely linked
to his energetic, charismatic, competent and obviously intelligent personality", says
Medvedev which led to this immediate acceptance of Gorbachev as leader (p. 183)
Inspite the fact that Gorbachev's new style was popular, some of his methods found less
favor. A lot of his actions were purely administrative, imposed from above without any
discussion and seemed coercive and disciplinarian to some people, especially
o intellectuals who expected liberalism. Medvedev seems to justify Gorbachev's first
decrees since they were "not designed to impress intellectuals, but rather aimed at
improving a sick economy" (p. 184).
It was very interesting to read about the "battle against the bottle" which Gorbachev
started immediately. For him vodka was a "public enemy number one", the cause of
increasing crime, poor productivity, an increasing number of problem children of alco
lic parents, reduced life expectancy and alcohol-related health problems, all of which
created a heavy burden on the national economy. Some of the measures that were taken by
the government were increasing the drinking age from 18 to 21, alcohol could
longer be sold in ordinary food stores, special wine shops would not be permitted to
sell any alcohol before 2 PM, stiff sentences were introduced for private stills. But
the anti-alcohol campaign quickly has became unpopular and "has created a degree
f social tension" which led to the canceling of the whole campaign by the government (p.
189).
During his first year Gorbachev made some big changes in the agricultural sector of the
Soviet Union. The decision was made to allocate annually from one million to one million
two hundred thousand allotments to citizens. Medvedev sees this decision a
"Gorbachev's second personal initiative which had a real practical and positive impact on
the quality of people's lives. The garden co-operatives reduced the pressure slightly on
state retail sales of vegetables and fruit, particularly in small towns"
. 201).
As for the domestic policy, according to Medvedev, Gorbachev's first year in power was
marked by "unprecedently large changes in the personnel of the Politburo and government
and the rapid formulation of economic targets and methods of economic developm
t for the next 15 years. In all other respects, however, the changes in domestic policy
were merely cosmetic" (p. 208). Policies were better presented, the style was more
modern, but there was little in the contents. Gorbachev has introduced very few
cial and political changes in his first year in office. Medvedev argues that this was
due to the fact that Gorbachev, as a professional Party official understood that
liberalization or democratization may turn against him (which is exactly how everythi
worked out some five years later, but of course Medvedev did not know this for sure back
in 1986). Also Gorbachev's new team had absolutely no desire to make the system more
liberal.
In the last chapter Medvedev talks about Soviet new diplomacy which was created by
Gorbachev in his first year in the office. First of all, Gorbachev's charm, sense of
humor, prompt responses, attempts to find convincing arguments "suddenly introduced
e human factor into East-West confrontation which in itself served to reduce tension.
Gorbachev clearly did not resemble a person who was waiting for the opportunity to drop a
nuclear bomb on the West" (p. 228). For Gorbachev two main issues were the
oblem of the arms race and Afghanistan, where the war had gone for two long and there was
no end in sight. Gorbachev wanted to accelerate economic development and the main task
of his diplomacy was the reduction of the cost of the foreign policy and th
meant substantial arms reductions. In his book Medvedev makes an assumption that the
Soviet government would not withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and Gorbachev will be
aiming for a "quick military end to the war" - assumption that proved to be wro
. On the other hand the author is right when he predicts the gradual thawing of the
Soviet-US relations, thawing that started in Geneva with Reagan-Gorbachev negotiations
and continued throughout Gorbachev's rule.
In his conclusion Medvedev makes a statement that "it has been abundantly clear that
Gorbachev is neither a liberal nor a bold reformist. He prefers small modifications,
administrative methods and economic adjustments to structural reform ... it is a m
take to expect too much from Gorbachev" (p. 245). This statement, as we all know,
quickly proved to be wrong.
The second book titled "The Gorbachev Phenomenon" was written by Moshe Lewin in 1988, two
years after Medvedev published his work and therefore it gives the reader a better
perspective on what happened while Gorbachev was in power. Lewin's book is stru
ured very similar to the first book that I described above. It also consists of the two
parts: one deals with the history of the Soviet Union before 1985, and the second part,
entitled "The New Course" discusses the changes that took place in the count
after Gorbachev became the General Secretary.
Right from the start the author says that the Soviet Union is on the "verge of important
changes in the way it conducts its affairs, maybe in the way it is run ... Russia is now
entering a crucial new stage and is therefore, in many respects, just a beg
ner" (Lewin, 1988, p. 1). Lewin follows Medvedev's steps in describing the new Soviet
leader and uses all kinds of approving terms such as "bright", "intelligent" and
"incisive". But unlike Medvedev Lewin makes an argument that the main reason for per
troika was not the individualism of Gorbachev but rather the crisis that had been created
by the mechanisms of economic management that had emerged in the 1930's and were still
powerful. He also talks about the enormous role of the people who were "pla
ng pressure on the governing model, insisting that each sphere of action receive the
attention it needed and that new institutions and new methods be created to serve the new
social forms. The system needed to loosen up" (p. 112). The answer to people'
pressure Gorbachev began his new line which was characterized by an appeal for frankness.
The leaders were ready to face the truth and report to the country that the system was
in a bad shape. This was particularly true about the economy. As the Part
Congress put it : "The production relations that exist currently, the system of
husbanding and managing, emerged, in substance, in conditions of extensive economic
development. Gradually they became obsolete, lost their stimulating power and turned,
i
many ways, into a hindrance" (p. 115). This new line did not stop with criticisms of the
management of the economy. Ideology and ideological life were also described as being in
shambles. The leaders admitted that Soviet people did not believe offici
statements and ideological dogma was a powerful obstacle to the country's development.
This was the beginning of the new page in the history of the Soviet Union which became
known all over the world as glasnost.
Together with the appeal for glasnost - a slogan but also a pledge to ease censorship and
facilitate the access to information - there was a call for uskorenie, a "speeding up of
the pace of economic development, especially technological progress". Lew
can not comprehend how some Western observers can still claim that nothing really
happens, that "there is no well-defined program, notably for economic reforms". Such
statements are "sheer obstinacy", according to the author since ideas for change are
eing debated, implemented, and tested. And the fact that no comprehensive program has
been announced seems rather as a good sign to Lewin, since "for what single program could
fill the bill?" (p. 116-117).
As against Medvedev, Lewin does not spend much time describing "the battle against the
bottle". He sums everything up in one sentence instead of two chapters and has a
different view of the successfulness of this initiative: "Although many predicted fa
ure, the government stuck to its guns, gained public support for its aims and the
anti-drinking campaign has achieved some success. This was clever and promising opening"
(p. 116).
Lewin's conclusions about the changes in the agricultural sector and foreign policy are
very similar to that of Medvedev. The author talks about how the center would ease its
control, how government would give more freedom in the choices that people inv
ved in producing the agricultural goods can have. Lewin underlined the importance of
Gorbachev's decision to allocate allotments which led to the bigger interest of the
Soviet people in working the land which ultimately led to the increase in agricultu
l production. Lewin also mentions the better Russian-American relations which was due to
the fact that Gorbachev was ready for discussions with the American president and has
chosen such international policy that led to the slowing down of the arms rac
and the reduction of the accumulation of arms.
As for the domestic policy Lewin has a different position than Medvedev, this is due to
a large extent to the fact that Lewin is writing his work two years after Medvedev.
"Glasnost, democratization, self-government in the workplace, orientation to th
social sphere, social justice, human rights, and respect for human individuality" -
reforms in these areas took place after three years of Gorbachev in power and influenced
domestic policy a lot according to Lewin (p. 119).
At the very end of the book Lewin makes a statement that proved to be so true after the
couple of years since this work was published. "The old system is still in place and its
supporters, deeply disturbed by the perestroika, will certainly resist chan
. The reformers are not assured of victory: they will have to fight hard for it, go for
bold new moves. Their failure would be terribly costly for the USSR and could well
produce negative repercussions worldwide. The world is now watching Moscow atte
ively and with good reason" (p. 153). It is hard to believe that these words were
written eight years ago....
The third book is probably the most important one since it is the work of the man who is
directly responsible for the changes that took place in the Soviet Union and who is also
responsible, although indirectly, for the changes that took place in the wh
e Eastern Europe. Gorbachev wrote a book entitled "Perestroika. New Thinking for Our
Country and the World" back in 1987, two years after he became the new Soviet leader. In
this book the author tries to answer the question of what is perestroika? Why
es the Soviet society need it? What are its substance and objectives? What does it
reject and what does it create? How is it proceeding and what might be its consequences
for the Soviet Union and the world community? In other words, all the question
that were raised and discussed by Medvedev and Lewin but answered by the originator.
Perestroika, according to Gorbachev, is an "urgent necessity arising from the profound
processes of development in our socialist society. This society is ripe for change. It
has been long yearning for it" (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 17). Perestroika was cau
d by all sorts of problems that the Soviet Union had accumulated over the seventy years.
First factor was a slowing economic growth which caused "a country that was once quickly
closing on the world's advanced nations began to lose one position after a
ther". At the same time the gap in the efficiency of production, quality of products,
scientific and technological development ... began to widen, and not to our advantage".
All this eventually led to an economic deadlock and stagnation that paralyzed
oviet society. Declining rates of growth affected other aspects of the Soviet life, for
instance the social sphere, which began to lag behind other spheres in terms of
technological development, personnel, know-how and quality of work. Gorbachev also
ntions a gradual erosion of the ideological and moral values of Soviet people as another
argument for the need of restructuring. People did not believe in the government because
of the many promises that it made and never accomplished; because the need
and opinions of ordinary working people, of the public at large, were ignored. There was
a process of decay in public morals; "the great feeling of solidarity with each other
that was forged during the heroic times of the Revolution, the first five-yea
plans, the Great Patriotic War and postwar rehabilitation was weakening" (p. 21-22).
Gorbachev also talks about alcoholism, drug addiction and culture alien to Soviet people,
which "bred vulgarity and low tastes and brought about ideological bareness".
This statement about "alien to us" culture reminded me of how this fight against
"degeneration" which American movies and other media brings was carried out - how people
were hiding the fact that they have the VCR, how it would be almost impossible to g
a videotape with an American movie but people would still manage to get it "through a
friend of a friend" and then watch it, which as Gorbachev puts it "bred vulgarity and low
tastes". Considering all the problems the government made "the only logical
onclusion" that the country was verging on crisis. This conclusion was announced at the
April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, "which inaugurated the new strategy
of perestroika and formulated its basic principles" (p. 24).
Gorbachev gives a plan of perestroika, its component parts which include: overcoming the
stagnation process, breaking down the braking mechanism. It means mass initiative. "It
is the comprehensive development of democracy, socialist self-government,
couragement of initiative, improved order and discipline, more glasnost, criticism in all
spheres of the society; respect for the individual". Perestroika is also the
intensification of the Soviet economy, development of the principles of democratic cen
alism and encouragement of socialist enterprise. It also means "the elimination from
society of the distortions of socialist ethics, implementation of the principles of
social justice. It means the unity of words and deeds, rights and duties". But Go
achev does not forget to include Lenin and says that "the essence of perestroika lies in
the fact that it unites socialism with democracy and revives the Leninist concept of
socialist construction both in theory and in practice" (p.34-35).
Gorbachev also gives his evaluation of perestroika. He is writing this book two and a
half years after the new line was launched and his assessment is as follows: "perestroika
is just getting of the ground. So far we have only been shaping the mechanis
of acceleration" (p. 64). The real work for him is still ahead and the main task is to
get the whole society involved in the process of restructuring.
In conclusion Gorbachev spends a lot of time talking about "new political thinking", new
Soviet foreign policy which should benefit international relations, especially
Soviet-American relations and provide for "nuclear-free, non-violent world". The mai
task of the Soviet foreign policy is to move "from suspicion and hostility to confidence,
from a balance of fear to a balance of reason and goodwill, from narrow nationalist
egoism to cooperation" (p. 254). Gorbachev feels that the not only the Soviet
ion but the whole world needs restructuring, a fundamental change - this, of course, does
not come as a surprise, if we remember that since 1917 first Bolsheviks and than
communists wanted to make this "fundamental change".
The three books that were discussed above were all written by different authors and in
different times but still basically they all have the same approach. Medvedev and Lewin
both approve the new leader of the Soviet Union and give all kinds of good ad
ctives to describe him such as "bright" and "intelligent". They both are optimistic
about the future of the country although make it clear that this is only a beginning of
the story to follow and since the perestroika just started at the time they were
riting their works they can only speculate about what would happen to the country. As
for Gorbachev he is probably the most optimistic about the new line which is not
surprising since he is the leader and leaders should radiate with confidence. He is
so the best source for finding out what perestroika is all about, its goals and its
origins. Of course now in 1996 many of his statements sound unfounded, even funny but
when we read his work we have to keep in mind that back in 1985 Gorbachev's ideas
unded new and revolutionary, destined to change the Soviet Union and even the whole world
- which did in fact happen.
The question whether Gorbachev's perestroika was a failure or a success does not have an
easy immediate answer. Some scholars argue that the reforms that lasted from 1985 to
1990 caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the country on the verge
f crisis, with economy in chaos and no certain future. Joan E. Spero, the author of the
book "The Politics Of International Economic Relations", is the supporter of this point
of view. In the chapter entitled "The Failure of Perestroika" she shows by
sing different examples, such as economical progress, stability of the country and so on,
that Gorbachev failed to achive the objectives of perestroika (Spero, 1996, p336).
Although I agree that Gorbachev did not achieve some of the goals stated in his
ook "Perestroika", I believe that perestroka was a success to a certain extent. First of
all, he did achieve some of the objectives. For instance, after the reforms the society
did become more open thanks to glasnost. People for the first time since
17 could say what they really thought and not what was "good for the party". People also
gained access to all sorts of information which was previously denied to them. Children
in schools and students in colleges could finally learn the history as it
s and not as it was seen by the Communist party. Another major success of perestroika
was the increasing openness of the country to the West which led to a considerable
improvements in East-West relations. This also led to the gradual reduction of ar
and considerable decline in defense spending in the Soviet Union as well as in the
United States. Considering these and other positive results of perestroika I would have
to disagree with those people who say that it was a complete failure. The rest
cturing that took place in the Soviet Union has many dimensions - some are positive, some
are negative. One-sided view which Joan E. Spero and other scholars advocate is not
correct, since it concentrates only on the adverse effects of perestroika, com
etely ignoring all the positive effects that it had.
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