positive, some are negative. One-sided view which Joan E. Spero and other scholars
advocate is
not correct, since it concentrates only on the adverse effects of perestroika, completely
ignoring all
the positive effects that it had.
The history of the Soviet Union is complicated and fascinating. In the course of only
seventy
years this country has seen the development of the totally new system of state, economic
growth, the
growth of hopes for the "brighter future", and then the sudden and expected by no one
collapse of
the whole system leading to chaos, wars, and confusion. One period is especially
important in order
to realize how did things finally started to change after the seventy years of blindly
pursuing the
dream of communism which left the Soviet Union in a very bad economical and moral state,
and this
period is called perestroika, Russian for restructuring. The main figure behind this
process which
began in 1985 is Mikhail S. Gorbachev who became General Secretary of the Communist Party
of
the Soviet Union Central Committee in March 1985. The three books that concentrate on
the
"Gorbachev phenomenon" were all unfortunately written before perestroika was finished, so
they do
not analyze the consequences that it had for the Soviet Union as well as for the whole
world . On
the other hand, all three of these books do a good job in explaining the changes that
took place in
the course of the first three years after Gorbachev came to power and why were these
changes
necessary.
The first book "Gorbachev" was written by Zhores A. Medvedev in 1986 and hence the
author is concentrating on the first year of the new course in Soviet history. The book
itself basically
consists of two parts: the first part where the author describes the "making of a General
Secretary",
and the second part entitled "Gorbachev in power" which describes Gorbachev's first year
in the
office. The first part of the book gives a lot of background information which allows
the reader to
see the stages in development of the Soviet leader from childhood and youth to
second-in-
command. One thing I found to be particularly interesting in Medvedev's description of
Gorbachev's
youth and that is the theory that living with a Czech intellectual for five years changed
the future
Soviet leader in such a way that he became more "westernized" which "indirectly provided
the Soviet
Union with a new style leader". Medvedev says that during the time from 1950 to 1955
when young
Gorbachev attended the Moscow State University and had to share the room with a Czech
student
Zdenek Mlynar he was "profoundly influenced" by the "culture and attitudes of a
traditionally
Western nation". This influence lasted for years and the fact that Gorbachev has become
"westernized" in his appearance, manners, dress and the "image he projects of tolerance
and cordial
behavior, all the small signs which mark him as different from the usual Komsomol and
Party boss",
is according to Medvedev due to a great extent to the fact that Mlynar was Gorbachev's
roommate
(Medvedev, 1986, p. 43).
Although the first part of the book is certainly interesting and important I would like
to
concentrate on the second part of the book since it is directly deals with the subject
that interests me
most, that is the years when Gorbachev was in power and the development of the new course
in the
Soviet life called perestroika. From just reading the first paragraph it is obvious that
the author
approves of the new leader. Medvedev writes: "For the first time in Soviet history, the
leadership
succession has meant more than the arrival of a new leader and the possibility of the
implementation
of the new policies. The Gorbachev succession marks the appearance of a new political
generation
which differs from the old guard in style, knowledge and historical vision....Gorbachev
represents a
younger post-war political generation, a generation which started its professional Party
or state
career during the more liberal Krushchev era" (p. 165). Medvedev quotes some of the very
enthusiastic Western newspaper comments which called Gorbachev a "bright, incisive,
brisk-
mannered man", with "high intelligence, considerable organizational abilities, political
acumen".
According to the author no previous Soviet leader had received so much immediate
publicity and
such an enthusiastic welcome from the general public. "Gorbachev's popularity was
closely linked to
his energetic, charismatic, competent and obviously intelligent personality", says
Medvedev which
led to this immediate acceptance of Gorbachev as leader (p. 183). Inspite the fact that
Gorbachev's
new style was popular, some of his methods found less favor. A lot of his actions were
purely
administrative, imposed from above without any discussion and seemed coercive and
disciplinarian
to some people, especially to intellectuals who expected liberalism. Medvedev seems to
justify
Gorbachev's first decrees since they were "not designed to impress intellectuals, but
rather aimed at
improving a sick economy" (p. 184).
It was very interesting to read about the "battle against the bottle" which Gorbachev
started
immediately. For him vodka was a "public enemy number one", the cause of increasing
crime, poor
productivity, an increasing number of problem children of alcoholic parents, reduced life
expectancy
and alcohol-related health problems, all of which created a heavy burden on the national
economy.
Some of the measures that were taken by the government were increasing the drinking age
from 18
to 21, alcohol could no longer be sold in ordinary food stores, special wine shops would
not be
permitted to sell any alcohol before 2 PM, stiff sentences were introduced for private
stills. But the
anti-alcohol campaign quickly has became unpopular and "has created a degree of social
tension"
which led to the canceling of the whole campaign by the government (p. 189).
During his first year Gorbachev made some big changes in the agricultural sector of the
Soviet Union. The decision was made to allocate annually from one million to one million
two
hundred thousand allotments to citizens. Medvedev sees this decision as "Gorbachev's
second
personal initiative which had a real practical and positive impact on the quality of
people's lives. The
garden co-operatives reduced the pressure slightly on state retail sales of vegetables
and fruit,
particularly in small towns" (p. 201).
As for the domestic policy, according to Medvedev, Gorbachev's first year in power was
marked by "unprecedently large changes in the personnel of the Politburo and government
and the
rapid formulation of economic targets and methods of economic development for the next 15
years.
In all other respects, however, the changes in domestic policy were merely cosmetic" (p.
208).
Policies were better presented, the style was more modern, but there was little in the
contents.
Gorbachev has introduced very few social and political changes in his first year in
office. Medvedev
argues that this was due to the fact that Gorbachev, as a professional Party official
understood that
liberalization or democratization may turn against him (which is exactly how everything
worked out
some five years later, but of course Medvedev did not know this for sure back in 1986).
Also
Gorbachev's new team had absolutely no desire to make the system more liberal.
In the last chapter Medvedev talks about Soviet new diplomacy which was created by
Gorbachev in his first year in the office. First of all, Gorbachev's charm, sense of
humor, prompt
responses, attempts to find convincing arguments "suddenly introduced the human factor
into East-
West confrontation which in itself served to reduce tension. Gorbachev clearly did not
resemble a
person who was waiting for the opportunity to drop a nuclear bomb on the West" (p. 228).
For
Gorbachev two main issues were the problem of the arms race and Afghanistan, where the
war had
gone for two long and there was no end in sight. Gorbachev wanted to accelerate
economic
development and the main task of his diplomacy was the reduction of the cost of the
foreign policy
and that meant substantial arms reductions. In his book Medvedev makes an assumption
that the
Soviet government would not withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and Gorbachev will be
aiming
for a "quick military end to the war" - assumption that proved to be wrong . On the
other hand the
author is right when he predicts the gradual thawing of the Soviet-US relations, thawing
that started
in Geneva with Reagan-Gorbachev negotiations and continued throughout Gorbachev's rule.
In his conclusion Medvedev makes a statement that "it has been abundantly clear that
Gorbachev is neither a liberal nor a bold reformist. He prefers small modifications,
administrative
methods and economic adjustments to structural reform ... it is a mistake to expect too
much from
Gorbachev" (p. 245). This statement, as we all know, quickly proved to be wrong.
The second book titled "The Gorbachev Phenomenon" was written by Moshe Lewin in
1988, two years after Medvedev published his work and therefore it gives the reader a
better
perspective on what happened while Gorbachev was in power. Lewin's book is structured
very
similar to the first book that I described above. It also consists of the two parts: one
deals with the
history of the Soviet Union before 1985, and the second part, entitled "The New Course"
discusses
the changes that took place in the country after Gorbachev became the General Secretary.
Right from the start the author says that the Soviet Union is on the "verge of important
changes in the way it conducts its affairs, maybe in the way it is run ... Russia is now
entering a
crucial new stage and is therefore, in many respects, just a beginner" (Lewin, 1988, p.
1). Lewin
follows Medvedev's steps in describing the new Soviet leader and uses all kinds of
approving terms
such as "bright", "intelligent" and "incisive". But unlike Medvedev Lewin makes an
argument that the
main reason for perestroika was not the individualism of Gorbachev but rather the crisis
that had
been created by the mechanisms of economic management that had emerged in the 1930's and
were
still powerful. He also talks about the enormous role of the people who were "placing
pressure on
the governing model, insisting that each sphere of action receive the attention it needed
and that new
institutions and new methods be created to serve the new social forms. The system needed
to
loosen up" (p. 112). The answer to people's pressure Gorbachev began his new line which
was
characterized by an appeal for frankness. The leaders were ready to face the truth and
report to the
country that the system was in a bad shape. This was particularly true about the
economy. As the
Party Congress put it : "The production relations that exist currently, the system of
husbanding and
managing, emerged, in substance, in conditions of extensive economic development.
Gradually they
became obsolete, lost their stimulating power and turned, in many ways, into a hindrance"
(p. 115).
This new line did not stop with criticisms of the management of the economy. Ideology
and
ideological life were also described as being in shambles. The leaders admitted that
Soviet people
did not believe official statements and ideological dogma was a powerful obstacle to the
country's
development. This was the beginning of the new page in the history of the Soviet Union
which
became known all over the world as glasnost.
Together with the appeal for glasnost - a slogan but also a pledge to ease censorship
and
facilitate the access to information - there was a call for uskorenie, a "speeding up of
the pace of
economic development, especially technological progress". Lewin can not comprehend how
some
Western observers can still claim that nothing really happens, that "there is no
well-defined program,
notably for economic reforms". Such statements are "sheer obstinacy", according to the
author since
ideas for change are being debated, implemented, and tested. And the fact that no
comprehensive
program has been announced seems rather as a good sign to Lewin, since "for what single
program
could fill the bill?" (p. 116-117).
As against Medvedev, Lewin does not spend much time describing "the battle against the
bottle". He sums everything up in one sentence instead of two chapters and has a
different view of
the successfulness of this initiative: "Although many predicted failure, the government
stuck to its
guns, gained public support for its aims and the anti-drinking campaign has achieved some
success.
This was clever and promising opening" (p. 116).
Lewin's conclusions about the changes in the agricultural sector and foreign policy are
very
similar to that of Medvedev. The author talks about how the center would ease its
control, how
government would give more freedom in the choices that people involved in producing the
agricultural goods can have. Lewin underlined the importance of Gorbachev's decision to
allocate
allotments which led to the bigger interest of the Soviet people in working the land
which ultimately
led to the increase in agricultural production. Lewin also mentions the better
Russian-American
relations which was due to the fact that Gorbachev was ready for discussions with the
American
president and has chosen such international policy that led to the slowing down of the
arms race and
the reduction of the accumulation of arms.
As for the domestic policy Lewin has a different position than Medvedev, this is due to
a
large extent to the fact that Lewin is writing his work two years after Medvedev.
"Glasnost,
democratization, self-government in the workplace, orientation to the social sphere,
social justice,
human rights, and respect for human individuality" - reforms in these areas took place
after three
years of Gorbachev in power and influenced domestic policy a lot according to Lewin (p.
119).
At the very end of the book Lewin makes a statement that proved to be so true after the
couple of years since this work was published. "The old system is still in place and its
supporters,
deeply disturbed by the perestroika, will certainly resist change. The reformers are not
assured of
victory: they will have to fight hard for it, go for bold new moves. Their failure would
be terribly
costly for the USSR and could well produce negative repercussions worldwide. The world
is now
watching Moscow attentively and with good reason" (p. 153). It is hard to believe that
these words
were written eight years ago....
The third book is probably the most important one since it is the work of the man who is
directly responsible for the changes that took place in the Soviet Union and who is also
responsible,
although indirectly, for the changes that took place in the whole Eastern Europe.
Gorbachev wrote a
book entitled "Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World" back in 1987, two
years
after he became the new Soviet leader. In this book the author tries to answer the
question of what
is perestroika? Why does the Soviet society need it? What are its substance and
objectives? What
does it reject and what does it create? How is it proceeding and what might be its
consequences for
the Soviet Union and the world community? In other words, all the questions that were
raised and
discussed by Medvedev and Lewin but answered by the originator.
Perestroika, according to Gorbachev, is an "urgent necessity arising from the profound
processes of development in our socialist society. This society is ripe for change. It
has been long
yearning for it" (Gorbachev, 1987, p. 17). Perestroika was caused by all sorts of
problems that the
Soviet Union had accumulated over the seventy years. First factor was a slowing economic
growth
which caused "a country that was once quickly closing on the world's advanced nations
began to
lose one position after another". At the same time the gap in the efficiency of
production, quality of
products, scientific and technological development ... began to widen, and not to our
advantage".
All this eventually led to an economic deadlock and stagnation that paralyzed Soviet
society.
Declining rates of growth affected other aspects of the Soviet life, for instance the
social sphere,
which began to lag behind other spheres in terms of technological development, personnel,
know-
how and quality of work. Gorbachev also mentions a gradual erosion of the ideological
and moral
values of Soviet people as another argument for the need of restructuring. People did
not believe in
the government because of the many promises that it made and never accomplished; because
the
needs and opinions of ordinary working people, of the public at large, were ignored.
There was a
process of decay in public morals; "the great feeling of solidarity with each other that
was forged
during the heroic times of the Revolution, the first five-year plans, the Great Patriotic
War and
postwar rehabilitation was weakening" (p. 21-22). Gorbachev also talks about alcoholism,
drug
addiction and culture alien to Soviet people, which "bred vulgarity and low tastes and
brought about
ideological bareness". This statement about "alien to us" culture reminded me of how
this fight
against "degeneration" which American movies and other media brings was carried out - how
people
were hiding the fact that they have the VCR, how it would be almost impossible to get a
videotape
with an American movie but people would still manage to get it "through a friend of a
friend" and
then watch it, which as Gorbachev puts it "bred vulgarity and low tastes". Considering
all the
problems the government made "the only logical conclusion" that the country was verging
on crisis.
This conclusion was announced at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee,
"which
inaugurated the new strategy of perestroika and formulated its basic principles" (p.
24).
Gorbachev gives a plan of perestroika, its component parts which include: overcoming
the
stagnation process, breaking down the braking mechanism. It means mass initiative. "It
is the
comprehensive development of democracy, socialist self-government, encouragement of
initiative,
improved order and discipline, more glasnost, criticism in all spheres of the society;
respect for the
individual". Perestroika is also the intensification of the Soviet economy, development
of the
principles of democratic centralism and encouragement of socialist enterprise. It also
means "the
elimination from society of the distortions of socialist ethics, implementation of the
principles of social
justice. It means the unity of words and deeds, rights and duties". But Gorbachev does
not forget
to include Lenin and says that "the essence of perestroika lies in the fact that it
unites socialism with
democracy and revives the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and
in practice"
(p.34-35).
Gorbachev also gives his evaluation of perestroika. He is writing this book two and a
half
years after the new line was launched and his assessment is as follows: "perestroika is
just getting of
the ground. So far we have only been shaping the mechanisms of acceleration" (p. 64).
The real
work for him is still ahead and the main task is to get the whole society involved in the
process of
restructuring.
In conclusion Gorbachev spends a lot of time talking about "new political thinking", new
Soviet foreign policy which should benefit international relations, especially
Soviet-American
relations and provide for "nuclear-free, non-violent world". The main task of the Soviet
foreign
policy is to move "from suspicion and hostility to confidence, from a balance of fear to
a balance of
reason and goodwill, from narrow nationalist egoism to cooperation" (p. 254). Gorbachev
feels that
the not only the Soviet Union but the whole world needs restructuring, a fundamental
change - this,
of course, does not come as a surprise, if we remember that since 1917 first Bolsheviks
and than
communists wanted to make this "fundamental change".
The three books that were discussed above were all written by different authors and in
different times but still basically they all have the same approach. Medvedev and Lewin
both
approve the new leader of the Soviet Union and give all kinds of good adjectives to
describe him
such as "bright" and "intelligent". They both are optimistic about the future of the
country although
make it clear that this is only a beginning of the story to follow and since the
perestroika just started
at the time they were writing their works they can only speculate about what would happen
to the
country. As for Gorbachev he is probably the most optimistic about the new line which is
not
surprising since he is the leader and leaders should radiate with confidence. He is also
the best
source for finding out what perestroika is all about, its goals and its origins. Of
course now in 1996
many of his statements sound unfounded, even funny but when we read his work we have to
keep in
mind that back in 1985 Gorbachev's ideas sounded new and revolutionary, destined to
change the
Soviet Union and even the whole world - which did in fact happen.
The question whether Gorbachev's perestroika was a failure or a success does not have an
easy immediate answer. Some scholars argue that the reforms that lasted from 1985 to
1990
caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the country on the verge of crisis, with
economy in
chaos and no certain future. Joan E. Spero, the author of the book "The Politics Of
International
Economic Relations", is the supporter of this point of view. In the chapter entitled
"The Failure of
Perestroika" she shows by using different examples, such as economical progress,
stability of the
country and so on, that Gorbachev failed to achive the objectives of perestroika (Spero,
1996,
p336). Although I agree that Gorbachev did not achieve some of the goals stated in his
book
"Perestroika", I believe that perestroka was a success to a certain extent. First of
all, he did achieve
some of the objectives. For instance, after the reforms the society did become more open
thanks to
glasnost. People for the first time since 1917 could say what they really thought and
not what was
"good for the party". People also gained access to all sorts of information which was
previously
denied to them. Children in schools and students in colleges could finally learn the
history as it was
and not as it was seen by the Communist party. Another major success of perestroika was
the
increasing openness of the country to the West which led to a considerable improvements
in East-
West relations. This also led to the gradual reduction of arms and considerable decline
in defense
spending in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States. Considering these and
other positive
results of perestroika I would have to disagree with those people who say that it was a
complete
failure. The restructuring that took place in the Soviet Union has many dimensions -
some are
positive, some are negative. One-sided view which Joan E. Spero and other scholars
advocate is
not correct, since it concentrates only on the adverse effects of perestroika, completely
ignoring all
the positive effects that it had.
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